A strategic leader has four tasks, in my view. The first is to get the big ideas right. As I mentioned earlier, those don’t come easy. It has to be the result of a lot of thinking, inclusive discussions, seminars, conferences, whatever it may be. But you’ve got to get them right. If you don’t get them right, if you don’t get the strategy right, all else is for naught here. Everything else you’re building then is on a foundation of sand. The second task is to communicate those big ideas effectively throughout the breadth and depth of the organization. And you do this in every way possible. The third task is to oversee the implementation of them, because of course, you’re not the one implementing them directly. That’s many levels below you. But you certainly have to go out and see for yourself. You have to have metrics. You have to have a battle rhythm. You have to have a whole series of tasks that you perform yourself, campaign plan reviews and on and on. It’s quite exhaustive. And then the fourth task is you have to identify how those big ideas need to be refined. It’s the process of identifying lessons, if you will. But lessons aren’t learned until they’re actually incorporated in the documents, the campaign plan, the policies, the procedures, the SOPs — whatever — that are the mechanism for conveying the big ideas. In Iraq, the big ideas were, in most cases, a complete shift from what it was that we were doing before. The biggest of the big ideas was that the human train was a decisive train, i.e., the people are the prize. You have to secure the people. And you can only secure the people by living with them, by locating your bases where they live in their neighborhood. So at a time when we were retreating to big bases, concentrating all our forces on big bases and going out and driving around a few times a day and then be back at the big base to handoff quicker to the Iraqis, we reversed that. We ultimately established, for example, we had to fight for and establish 77 additional locations at which our troopers were located — together with Iraqis typically — 77 just in the Greater Baghdad divisional area.