I changed the mission statement, and the first piece of our campaign plan within that first week. I knew what I needed to do. I didn’t need to go through a process of — you know, I’d been in Iraq for two-and-a-half years at that point in time and had studied it when I was not there and worked out these ideas for counterinsurgency. And I started communicating them — the second task — the very first day, right after taking the colors, if you will, and becoming the commander in your first change of command remarks. And that’s where the focus is, on securing the people. It can only be done by living with them, not by consolidating on big bases. Then I gathered the commanders together who were at the change of command, of course, and talked to them about what we were going to do. Put out a letter to all of our troopers on the very first day — the soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians of Multi-National Force Iraq. It went on and on from there. Then, ultimately, we revised the whole campaign plan and et cetera and et cetera. Then the overseeing the implementation. We had to work metrics very hard. It took six months before I was willing to actually release how we reached the metrics, how we arrived at them, what were the definitions of the terms and all the rest of that. To sit down with The New York Times, The Washington Post, the major networks, and go through them, so you can tell “Are we winning or are we losing?” “Are we making progress…” is a better way actually of saying it, “… or are we not?” Because I don’t think you win these kinds of endeavors.