Reconciliation in particular was a bit of a tough sell early on. I had commanders come to me and say, “Hey sir, you want me to sit down across the table from this sheik of the tribe that’s been fighting us?  I mean, he has our blood on his hands. And you want me to sit down and negotiate with him?” And I said, “Yeah, that’s how these things end.” And I said, “By the way, I think we can do it. And I think he has an incentive in supporting the new Iraq if you can get him to see that. Rather than continuing to fight and also having Al Qaeda blowing him up for his troubles as well.” So that’s what we did. But there were a lot of tough moments, and you have what we would occasionally call “full range of emotion” meetings. There were some by design. I would tell people on the way to a particular meeting with a particularly senior Iraqi figure or other senior figures inside Iraq that, you know, “Buckle your seat belts, ’cause this is going to be a rugged one fellas, and what I need you to do is just let it go unless you think I’m no longer acting. And if you really think I’m truly getting emotional about this, then you need to pluck my sleeve,” because that’s where you occasionally do something that is, as we say, “non-biodegradable.”