So in 2006 and 2007 we could see that it was coming, because it’s “another one of those.” And it was a very interesting time because — I won’t name the policy makers — but the leading policy makers go to Washington and have conversations with them, and it seemed very, very likely that that was going to happen. And as it was happening there was a lack of understanding of it, and the reason that there was a reluctance to embrace this is, first of all, it was controversial, so it seemed improbable, because it never happened before in their lifetimes. Right? And then there was a certain amount of conventional wisdom, and there was not enough discussion, quality discussion. Why might something that seemed so improbable be true? And then the willingness, I think, to think independently, just on the basis of that merit. And yet it was just “another one of those,” and if you understand the cause/effect linkage, it had to occur. So we knew — you don’t know anything, it seemed highly likely — and we then were positioned so that our clients did well in 2008 when most people did terribly. And yet there were no excuses to do terribly really, and there were no excuses for letting that happen, other than they didn’t experience it before. Now let me say, that that always happens. It’s okay. We all make those mistakes, but the lesson to be learned from that is that you could be wrong, and that you need to understand how the machine works, and you need to look at those probabilities and that these things have happened before.